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TIME FOR CHANGE: A CALL FOR THE LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF TRANSSEXUAL AND OTHER
TRANSGENDER PERSONS IN HONG KONG
a
Robyn Emerton*
This is the second of two articles by the author on the law relating to transgender
persons in Hong Kong. The first article, which appeared in Volume 34(2) (2004)
of this journal, examined in detail the current administrative and legal status of
Hong Kong's transgender persons. This article considers how the present,
unsatisfactory situation could be challenged through the courts or changed through
legislative reform. First, the article examines the potential of judicial review proceedings
under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Basic Law against the Hong
Kong authorities' refusal to allow transgender persons to marry in their chosen gender
or to amend their birth certificates. This section draws heavily on international and
comparative case law, and in particular the landmark decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v United Kingdom and I v United Kingdom
(2002). Concluding that there is a strong case to be argued under the right to marry,
but that litigation is unlikely to provide a comprehensive solution to the problems
faced by Hong Kong's transgender persons, the article then calls for full legal
recognition to be granted to them through legislative means, and considers which of
several models (focusing on Singapore, Japan and the United Kingdom) might be
most suitable for Hong Kong.
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Introduction
For over 20 years, transgenderism' has been recognised by Hong Kong's medi-
cal profession, and the Hong Kong government has provided public funding
for its treatment through a specialist Gender Identity Clinic at Queen Mary
Hospital. Such funding covers counselling and, for those who proceed further,
the provision of gender reassignment surgery,2 which aims to bring a
transgender person's physical self in alignment with their psychological gen-
der identity. Some estimates put the number of transgender persons in Hong
Kong at 3,000.3 Of those, it is known that over 50 persons have undergone
gender reassignment surgery to date through the Gender Identity Clinic at
Queen Mary Hospital.' Many more have undergone surgery privately, both
in Hong Kong and, more commonly, overseas. In addition, various adminis-
trative concessions are made to facilitate the daily lives of those transgender
persons who have completed gender reassignment surgery (frequently referred
to as "post-operative transsexual persons"). These concessions include the
reissue of identity cards, passports, driving licences and other documentation
in their chosen gender. However, despite living permanently in their chosen
gender and being recognised in that gender by the medical profession, the
health authorities and (in the case of post-operative transsexual persons) the
administrative authorities, Hong Kong's transgender persons are never ex-
tended legal recognition of their chosen gender. In other words, they remain
forever classified under the law as their biological sex, as designated at birth.
This is even true of those who have undergone gender reassignment surgery.
The plight of Hong Kong's transgender persons recently came to the fore
after the suicide of Louise Chan, a young transgender woman, on 21 Septem-
ber 2004. Louise first came to the public's attention when she was stalked and
"outed" by the local media in 2003 resulting, amongst other things, in the
loss of her job.' Two days after Louise's death, another transgender woman,
I The medical term for transgenderism is "gender dysphoria" or "gender identity disorder". The term
"gender dysphoria" is adopted, for example, by the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM IV, 1994. The term "gender identity disorder" is
used, for example, by the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoric Association, see
http://www.hbigda.org (visited 10 Nov 2004).
2 The Gender Identity Clinic at Queen Mary Hospital uses the term "sex reassignment surgery".
Gender reassignment surgery is also still commonly referred to as a "sex change operation" in Hong
Kong.
David Watkins, "Victories and Setbacks for Hong Kong's Transsexuals", South China Morning Post
(hereinafter "SCMP"), 26 Oct 2004, p A40.
S M.L. Ng and J.L.C Ma, "Hong Kong" in Robert T. Francoeur (ed), International Encyclopedia of
Sexuality on the Web: Volume 4 (New York and London: Continuum Publishing Group, 2001),
pp 216, 230 at http://www.sexquest.com/IES4/ (visited 10 Nov 2004).
5 Ravina Shamdasani, "Cross-dresser Slams Media Stalking", SCMP, 26 May 2003, p C3; and
Benjamin Wong, "Suicide of Transsexual Triggers Activists' Plea for Better Support", SCMP,
22 Sept 2004, p C4.
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Sasha Moon, also committed suicide.6 A whole host of press reports and
radio programmes on transgender related matters has followed. Whilst it is
lamentable that it has taken two such sad events to focus public attention on
this issue, it is hoped that Louise Chan's and Sasha Moon's legacies are to
have raised greater public awareness and understanding of the difficult situa-
tion faced by transgender persons in Hong Kong. This, in due course, will
lead to full recognition of their chosen gender in law. This article, together
with an earlier article published by the author in the HKLJ, "Neither Here
Nor There: The Current Status of Transsexual and Other Transgender
Persons Under Hong Kong Law",' aims to advance the debate and to precipi-
tate change.
Significantly, Hong Kong is out of sync with the international trend to
legally recognise transgender persons (or at least post-operative transsexual
persons) in their chosen gender. The vast majority of countries in Europe,
including most recently the United Kingdom, together with many states/ prov-
inces in the United States and Canada now grant legal recognition to
transgender persons. Nor has this development been confined to the "western
world". In the Asia-Pacific region, similar advances have also been made. In
some cases, these have been achieved through judicial means. Courts in
Australia,' New Zealand,9 and the Philippines,"o for example, have recognised
the chosen gender of transgender persons to different degrees. In other juris-
dictions within the Asia-Pacific region, new legislation has been passed, or
existing legislation amended, to grant complete or partial legal recognition to
transgender persons. Thus many of Australia's states and territories," New
6 Clifford Lo, "Transsexual leaps to her death in front of boyfriend", SCMP, 24 Sept 2004, p 3.
34 HKLJ 245.
8 In Australia, post-operative transsexual persons have been recognised in their chosen gender for
the purposes of marriage (Attorney General for the Commonwealth v "Kevin and Jennifer" & Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2003] FCA 94 (hereinafter "Kevin and Jennifer"), avail-
able at http://www.austlii.edu.au/ (visited 10 Nov 2004)); the criminal law (R v Cogley 799 VR
799; R v Harris and McGuiness 17 NSWLR 158); and social security law (Secretary, Department of
Social Security v SRA, [1993] 118 ALR 467). In one of the rare cases to also consider the legal status
of a pre-operative transsexual person, the court in R v Harris and McGuiness held that such a person
should be regarded as their biological sex, not their chosen gender.
9 In New Zealand, post-operative transsexual persons have been recognised in their chosen gender
for the purpose of marriage, Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] NZLR 603.
10 In the Philippines, the courts have granted full legal recognition to post-operative transsexual per-
sons by ordering the authorities to amend their birth certificate in individual cases. For example, In
the Matter of Change of the Entries as to Name and Sex in the Certificate of Live Birth from Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio to Mely D Silverio andfrom Male to Female, SP Case No 02-1055207, Republic
of the Philippines, National Capital Judicial Region, Regional Trial Court, Branch Vill, Manila
(4 Jun 2003), one of several successful petitions on file with the author, kindly provided by Attor-
ney Benito Cuesta of Cuesta & Associates, Manila, the Philippines. See also "UP Prof: From Rommel
to Mely", Philippine Star News, 2 Aug 2003, p 1. The case of Mely Silverio is, however, currently
under appeal.
" Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (Western Australia); Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration
Amendment Act 1997 (Northern Territory); Births, Deaths and Marriage Registration Act 1997
(Australian Capital Territory); Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (New South
Wales); and Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 (South Australia).
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Zealand,12 Singapore," and most recently Japan," have all legislated in this
field. There are also reports of administrators in certain provinces of the People's
Republic of China granting full legal recognition to transgender persons, in-
cluding for the purpose of marriage."
This article considers how the unsatisfactory legal status of transgender
persons in Hong Kong might be challenged through the courts or changed
through legislative reform. First, it examines the potential of judicial review
proceedings under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance ("BORO")16 and
the Basic Law," against the authorities' refusal to allow transgender persons
to marry in their chosen gender (or to recognise the validity of such marriages),
and their refusal to amend the birth certificates of transgender persons. This
section draws heavily on international and comparative case law, in particu-
lar the landmark decisions of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR")
in Goodwin v United Kingdom and I v United Kingdom (collectively referred to
as "Goodwin")," in which the United Kingdom was held to be in breach of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("European Convention") for maintaining the very same policies as
those in Hong Kong. Concluding that there is a strong case under the right to
marry, but that litigation is unlikely to provide a comprehensive solution to
the problems faced by Hong Kong's transgender persons, the article then calls
for full legal recognition to be granted to them through legislative means, and
considers which of several models (focusing on Singapore, Japan and the United
Kingdom) might be most suitable for Hong Kong.
Understanding the Terminology
In this article, the term "transgender" is used as an umbrella term for all those
persons who have a deep conviction that their biological sex, as designated at
birth, is incompatible with their gender, that is, their psychological or inner
sense of being male or female, and who have an overwhelming desire perma-
nently to live and function in the opposite gender to their biological sex (their
12 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995.
13 Women's Charter Amendment Act 1996.
14 Law Concerning Special Cases In Handling Gender For People With Gender Identity Disorder.
This came into effect on 16 Jul 2004.
15 Chan Siu-Sin, "Wedding Belle", SCMP, 3 May 2004, p 5; Ray Cheung "Transsexual Ties the Knot
after Gender Approval", SCMP, 18 Mar 2004, p A8; and Alice Yan, "Transgender Man First to
Legally Wed", SCMP, 3 Jan 2004, p 4.
16 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383), Laws of Hong Kong (hereinafter "BORO").
17 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
(Cap 2101), Laws of Hong Kong (hereinafter the "Basic Law").
1 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom Government, [2002] ECHR 28957/95; 1 v United Kingdom
Government, [2002] ECHR 25680/94, judgment delivered 11 Jul 2002 (hereinafter collectively re-
ferred to as "Goodwin"). Note that all the ECHR decisions referred to in this article are also available
at the ECHR's HUDOC database, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm.
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"chosen gender"). It includes transsexual persons, who intend to undergo
surgical procedures to bring their physical self in alignment with their gender
identity (usually referred to as "pre-operative transsexual persons"), and those
who have already undergone such gender reassignment surgery ("post-opera-
tive transsexual persons"). It also encompasses those other transgender persons
who, for whatever reason, be it health-related or otherwise, do not intend to
undergo surgery (although they may be receiving hormonal treatment), but
who have nevertheless permanently adopted the opposite gender to their bio-
logical sex or have an overwhelming desire to do so. Sometimes, a broader
meaning of the term "transgender" is adopted in the literature, which also
includes cross-dressers (colloquially referred to as "transvestites"). However,
as cross-dressers do not desire to live permanently in the opposite gender to
their biological sex, and therefore do not seek legal recognition in that gender,
their particular situation falls outside the scope of this article. Further, for the
purpose of this article, those transgender persons who identify as men are
referred to as "transgender men" (or "transsexual men" as appropriate), and
those transgender persons who identify as women are referred to as "transgender
women" (or "transsexual women" as appropriate). This gives due respect to a
person's gender identity, which is denied by the opposite classification in some
of the literature.
Litigating for Change
No specific provision is made for transgender persons in Hong Kong's
legislation, nor have any precedents been established by the Hong Kong courts
as to how laws of general applicability should be applied to the particular
situation of transgender persons. The Hong Kong authorities' policies with
respect to transgender persons are therefore driven by their own interpreta-
tion of the relevant legislation (in the context of this article, the Marriage
Ordinance, the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance and the Births and Deaths
Registration Ordinance). Providing a transgender person is willing to front a
test case,19 and brave the time, costs and inevitable publicity involved, then
the authorities' implementation of these policies in his or her particular case
is capable of challenge by way of judicial review. With the growing confi-
dence and activism of the transgender community in Hong Kong, the time
might well be ripe to push for change through the courts in this way.
19 The applicant in judicial review proceedings must be able to show "sufficient interest in the matter
to which the application related", Ord 53, r 3(7) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 4), Laws
of Hong Kong. Public interest litigation is not permitted in Hong Kong.
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The following section examines the potential of judicial review proceed-
ings against the Hong Kong authorities' policies as regards the marriage and
birth certificates of transgender persons. The constitutionality of these poli-
cies is examined in the context of the right to marry, the right to privacy and
the right to equality, which are variously guaranteed in the BORO and the
Basic Law. These instruments are binding on both the government and pub-
lic authorities." If the authorities' interpretation of the law and consequent
policies can be demonstrated as being incompatible with the BORO and/or
the Basic Law, then the courts would be obliged to declare them invalid, as
well as to grant remedies in the applicant's particular case."
The potential success of judicial review proceedings relies on the courts'
sympathetic interpretation of the three specified rights (the rights to marry,
privacy and equality) vis &' vis their application to the situation of transgender
persons in Hong Kong. Importantly, the Hong Kong courts have held that,
due to their constitutional character, a broader and more generous (purposive)
approach should be adopted towards the interpretation of the BORO and the
Basic Law than towards ordinary statutes.22 In particular, the courts have
held that assistance may be gleaned from international and comparative case
law (particularly from jurisdictions with an entrenched constitution) in the
interpretation of the human rights provisions contained in the BORO and
the Basic Law.23 The following section therefore sets out the current situa-
tion in Hong Kong, then surveys relevant international and comparative
jurisprudence, and finally discusses its likely impact on the Hong Kong courts
in determining the issues. First, however, a few comments are pertinent on
the general judicial climate in which any such proceedings would be brought.
20 BORO, Art 7.
21 See further below, p 533.
22 See, for example, the oft-quoted passage from the Court of Appeal judgment in R v Sin Yau-ming
[1991] 1 HKPLR 88, in which Silke VP (at 107), having remarked on the special constitutional
character of the BORO, heralded the BORO as ushering in an "entirely new jurisprudential ap-
proach" under which the courts "are no longer guided by the ordinary canons of construction of
statutes nor with the dictate of the common law". As regards the Basic Law, see Ng Ka-Ling and
others v Director of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 315, in which the Court of Final Appeal stated (at
340) that "what is set out in Chapter III [of the Basic Law] are the constitutional guarantees for the
freedoms that lie at the heart of Hong Kong's separate system. The courts should give a generous
interpretation to the provisions in Chapter Ill that contain these constitutional guarantees in order
to give to Hong Kong residents the full measure of fundamental rights and freedoms so constitu-
tionally guaranteed". Note that all the Hong Kong cases referred to in this article are also available
at the Hong Kong Legal Information Institute at http://www.hklii.org.
23 See R v Sin Yau-ming (n 22 above) in which Silke VP stated (at 105-107) that international and
comparative case law, though not binding, would be considered "of the greatest assistance" and
would be given "considerable weight". This view was upheld, albeit in more muted tones, by the
Privy Council in Attorney-General v Lee Kwong-kut; Attorney General v Lo Chak-man and another
1199313 HKPLR 71, at 90-91.
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Human Rights Litigation in the Current Judicial Climate
Since the following analysis draws heavily on international and comparative
case law, it should be stated at this juncture that doubts have been expressed
as to the receptiveness of the Hong Kong courts towards such materials in
practice. In the context of the BORO litigation, various commentators found
cause to remark in the late 1990s that the Hong Kong courts had a tendency
to dismiss international and comparative case law as "unhelpful",14 and to
look with "indifference and occasionally irritation"25 on attempts to invoke
such jurisprudence before them. However, recent case law seems to give more
cause for optimism.26 In the 2000s, the Hong Kong courts have clearly shown
themselves to be receptive to arguments based on international and
comparative materials in interpreting the human rights guarantees contained
in the BORO and the Basic Law." They have also kept an open mind to such
arguments in interpreting human rights concepts in ordinary domestic
legislation.28 Thus it is to be hoped that the following analysis, which relies
on the Hong Kong courts being persuaded by the ECHR decision in Goodwin
as well as by some comparative case law, is not overly optimistic.
24 Andrew Byrnes, "And Some Have Bills of Rights Thrust Upon Them: The Experience of Hong
Kong's Bill of Rights", in Philip Alston, Promoting Human Rights through Bills of Rights: Comparative
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p 352.
25 Johannes M.M. Chan, "Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: Its Reception and Contribution to Interna-
tional and Comparative Jurisprudence" (1998) 47 ICLQ 306, at 314-315 and 355.
26 In a review of the first 10 years' of jurisprudence under the BORO in 2002, Byrnes expressed the
view that the courts were becoming more receptive to arguments based on international and com-
parative case law, but was nevertheless under the impression that the courts tended to invoke such
jurisprudence when it supported a restrictive reading of rights under the BORO and to put it to one
side if it supported a broader reading of a right than they were inclined to adopt; Andrew Byrnes,
"Jumpstarting the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in its Second Decade? The Relevance of International
and Comparative Jurisprudence", paper presented at A Decade of the Bill of Rights and the ICCPR in
Hong Kong: Review and Prospects, 12 Jan 2002, Centre for Comparative and Public Law, University
of Hong Kong, available at http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/pub/conferences/index.html (visited
10 Nov 2004), pp 3-4.
27 See, for example, the Court of Final Appeal decision in Chow Shun Yung v Wei Pih Stella and Another
(2003) HKFCA 18, in which Justice Ribeiro PJ stated (para 36) that the jurisprudence of the
ECHR on Art 6(1) was "enlightening" and "should be given substantial weight in deciding the
scope and effect of BORO Article 10", and the Court of Final Appeal decision in Shum Kwok Sher
v HKSAR [2002] 2 HKLRD 793, in which Sir Anthony Mason NPJ (para 59), stated that, in
interpreting Chapter III of the Basic Law and the provisions of BORO, "the court might consider it
appropriate to take account of the established principles of international jurisprudence as well as
the decisions of international and national courts and tribunals on like or substantially similar
provisions in the ICCPR, other international instruments and national constitutions." The recent
decision of the Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Leung Kwok Hung HCMA 16/2003, judgment of
10 Nov 2004, drew inter alia on the jurisprudence of the ECHR and the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada in identifying the appropriate limitations to be placed on the freedom of assembly
under Art 27 of the Basic Law.
28 See, for example, Hartman J's references to the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 18
(Non-Discrimination) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women in interpreting provisions of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance in Equal Opportunities
Commission v Director of Education, [20011 2 HKLRD 690.
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It has been further noted that very few challenges have been successful
under the BORO after the first few heady years of its introduction in 1991.29
This situation has often been attributed to early statements made by the Privy
Council in Attorney-General v Lee Kwong-kut, 0 in which it warned that dis-
putes as to the effect of the BORO should not be allowed to "get out of hand"
and stated that "it must be remembered that questions of policy remain pri-
marily the responsibility of the legislature"." As various commentators
remarked in the late 1990s, these observations had the effect of severely damp-
ening the initial enthusiasm and innovativeness of Hong Kong's judges towards
the interpretation of the rights guaranteed by the BORO, and made the Hong
Kong courts reluctant to subject the executive and legislature to any mean-
ingful scrutiny against the standards of the BORO.32 The same reluctance
might perhaps be expected of the courts in interpreting the Basic Law after
the Court of Final Appeal's decisions in the "right of abode cases" in 1999
were controversially "reinterpreted" by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress of the PRC ("NPCSC"), at the behest of the
Hong Kong government." Certainly, in the later "flag burning" case, the
Court of Final Appeal was seen to "reposition" itself so as to avoid possible
conflict with the Central government." However, these were both politi-
cally sensitive cases, involving relations between the Hong Kong and Central
governments. As Benny Tai has concluded, providing there is no conflict
with "its more important constitutional position as the guardian of Hong
Kong's rule of law" (in terms of avoiding any further ingress on the judicial
authority of the Hong Kong courts than that caused by the NPCSC's reinter-
pretation in the right of abode cases), there is no cause to believe that the
Court of Final Appeal has given up "its constitutional position as the guard-
ian of human rights"." Indeed, recent case law demonstrates that both the
29 Byrnes (n 26 above), p 3 .
30 Attorney General v Lee Kwong-kut (n 23 above).
31 Ibid., at 100.
32 Byrnes (n 24 above), pp 352 and 356; Chan (n 25 above), at 335; and Roda Mushkat, "Interna-
tional Law in HKSAR Courts" (1998) 28(2) California Western International Law Journal, 353, at
374-375.
33 Ng Ka-Ling and others v Director of Immigration (n 22 above).
3 HKSAR v Ng Kung Sui and another [1999] 3 HKLRD 907. In this case, the Court of Final Appeal,
overruling the Court of Appeal, held that national and regional laws criminalising the desecration
of the national flag constituted a valid restriction on the freedom of expression, as guaranteed by
Art 27 of the Basic Law.
3 Benny Y.T. Tai, "Chapter 1 of Hong Kong's New Constitution: Constitutional Positioning and
Repositioning", Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So (eds), Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong
Kong (New York: M.E.Sharpe Inc, 2002; and Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2002),
pp 205, 208. In this regard, it will be interesting to see what position the Court of Final Appeal
adopts if the recent Court of Appeal decision in HKSAR v Leung Kwok Hung (n 27 above), is
appealed, in which the Court held (by a majority) that the notification scheme for public proces-
sions under the Public Order Ordinance was constitutional, as being a valid restriction on the
freedom of assembly, as guaranteed by Art 27 of the Basic Law.
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Court of Final Appeal and the lower courts are still willing to hold against
the government on human rights issues, even where their decisions have
far-reaching implications.36 The courts have a particularly strong track record
in upholding equal treatment, requiring the government to put forward
compelling reasons to justify any departure from it." All of this indicates a
positive environment in which the rights of transgender persons would be
determined by the Hong Kong courts.
Challenging the Current Policies on Marriage
The first policy which is open to challenge through judicial review proceed-
ings is the refusal of the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages to celebrate
a marriage involving a transgender person in Hong Kong. Alternatively, the
refusal of various authorities to recognise the validity of such a marriage, even
if it was validly contracted overseas, could be tested. Such a challenge would
need to be framed within the right to marry, as contained in the BORO
(Article 19 guarantees "the right of men and women of marriageable age
to marry") and the Basic Law (Article 37 guarantees, more broadly, "the
freedom of marriage of Hong Kong residents").
36 For example, the Court of Final Appeal's decision in Secretary for justice and others v Chan Wah and
others [2000] HKLRD 641 required the reform of the village electoral arrangements, which were
held inter alia to be contrary to the right to participate in public life under Art 21 of BORO; and
Hartmann J's decision in Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Education (n 28 above) neces-
sitated the overhaul of the Secondary School Allocation System, which was held to be contrary to
the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. The Court of Final Appeal also recently held against the gov-
ernment in Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar FACV00016/2003, judgment of 8 Jun 2004, in
a traditional judicial review of the Secretary for Security's decision to deport a person who was in
danger of being subjected to torture on return to their home country. It should be further noted that
the Court of Final Appeal conducted a wide-ranging review of international materials in this case,
including those not formally applicable to Hong Kong.
37 See, for example, Ng Ka-Ling and others v Director of Immigration (n 22 above), in which the Court
of Final Appeal held certain provisions in the Immigration Ordinance, which discriminated against
children born out of wedlock, to be contrary to the principle of equality as enshrined in Art 25 of
the Basic Law (note that this part of the decision still stands, it not having been referred by the
Hong Kong government to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC
for "reinterpretation"); Secretary forjustice and others v Chan Wah and others (n 36 above) in which
the Court of Final Appeal held that the village electoral arrangements discriminated against men,
contrary to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance; Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Educa-
tion (n 28 above) and KYW v Secretary for Justice DCEO3/1999, in which the District Court held
that the policies of the Fire Services Department and Excise Department not to employ persons
who had a parent who suffered from schizophrenia were discriminatory under the Disability Dis-
crimination Ordinance. See also Carole J. Petersen, "The Right to Equality in the Public Sector:
An Assessment of Post-Colonial Hong Kong", (2002) 32 HKLJ 103.
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The Current Situation in Hong Kong
All marriages which are celebrated in Hong Kong are governed by the Mar-
riage Ordinance." Section 40 of the Marriage Ordinance stipulates that a
marriage is the "voluntary union for life of one man and one woman", but the
Ordinance does not define the words "man" and "woman" for these purposes.
When asked to confirm the current policy on marriages involving transgender
persons, the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages stated that he is "not
in a position to celebrate [a] marriage between persons of the same biological
sex",39 even if one of them has undergone gender reassignment surgery. Un-
der the current policy, heterosexual transgender persons40 and their partners
are therefore not permitted to marry in Hong Kong. This deprives them of
the opportunity to publicly declare their love and commitment to each other
through a marriage ceremony. It also denies them social recognition of their
relationship and the whole range of rights, responsibilities and benefits which
attach to marriage. These include numerous rights and benefits during mar-
riage (for example, the married person's tax allowance, the right as a married
couple to public housing, the right to employment benefits for one's spouse,
the ability to bring one's foreign spouse into Hong Kong as a dependent, and
access to certain reproductive assistance, including artificial donor
insemination); rights and responsibilities on the breakdown of marriage (for
example, parental rights and responsibilities, maintenance); and rights on
the death of one's spouse (for example, inheritance rights, the right to claim
a survivor's pension benefit).
As regards marriages which have been validly entered into overseas
(in the Asia-Pacific region alone, such marriages are already permitted in
Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and Singapore, as well as in certain provinces of
China and certain states and territories of Australia), the Immigration
Department," and Inland Revenue Department,42 have similarly stated that
they would not recognise such marriages for immigration or taxation purposes,
on the grounds that "the parties are not respectively male and female" and
that their marriages are therefore void under section 20(1)(d) of the Matri-
monial Causes Ordinance.4
38 Marriage Ordinance (Cap 181), Laws of Hong Kong.
3 Letter to the author from the Director of Immigration (who is also the Registrar of Births, Deaths
and Marriages), 7 Aug 2002 (on file with the author).
40 Defined as those who are attracted to persons of the opposite gender identity, although they share
the same biological sex. Ironically, however (since gay or lesbian marriages are not otherwise per-
mitted in Hong Kong), transgender persons who are homosexual (those who are attracted to persons
of the same gender identity, but are of the opposite biological sex) are permitted to marry in Hong
Kong.
41 Letter to the author from the Immigration Department, 6 Dec 2002 (on file with the author). See
further, Emerton, "Neither Here Nor There" (n 7 above), at 267.
42 Letter to the author from the Inland Revenue Department, 6 Aug 2004 (on file with the author).
See further, Emerton, "Neither Here Nor There" (n 7 above), at 267-268.
43 Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap 179), Laws of Hong Kong.
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The Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages expressly cites Corbett v
Corbett" as the basis for his policy of refusing to celebrate marriages involv-
ing transgender persons where the persons are of the same biological sex,
whilst the policies of the Immigration Department and Inland Revenue
Department are also impliedly based on Corbett's biological test of sex.
Corbett's Biological Test of Sex
Corbett concerned the case of Arthur Corbett, who married April Ashley, a
post-operative transsexual woman, in full knowledge of her transgender history.
On the breakdown of their marriage, Mr Corbett petitioned for a declaration
of nullity on the ground that his wife was male at the time of the marriage, or
alternatively, incapable of consummating the marriage. The Court found in
his favour on both counts.
In determining the definition of sex for the purpose of marriage in
Corbett,41 Ormrod J adopted a purely biological test. This had regard to three
factors, genitals (penis in males; vagina in females), gonads (testes in males;
ovaries in females) and chromosomes (XY in males; XX in females). If all
three biological factors were congruent at birth, then this would determine a
person's sex for the purpose of marriage.46 Although all the medical expert
witnesses in Corbett agreed that psychological factors were also relevant in
the assessment of the sex of a person," Ormrod chose not to include psycho-
logical criteria in his legal definition of sex for the purpose of marriage. In his
view, the procreative purpose of marriage rendered it "a relationship which
depends on sex and not on gender"48 (gender being understood to include
psychological factors), and even gender reassignment surgery could not
"reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing the essential
[procreative] role of a woman in marriage".49 Ormrod also adopted the unani-
mous opinion of the medical experts that a person's biological sex was fixed at
birth, and therefore held that any surgical intervention, such as gender reas-
signment surgery, was irrelevant in determining a person's sex for the purpose
of marriage.o Regarding the second submission, namely that the marriage
was voidable on the grounds of non-consummation, Ormod expressed
the view that intercourse using "a completely artificial cavity", such as that
4 [1970] 2 All ER 33 (hereinafter "Corbett").
4 Corbett concerned the common law definition of marriage, which was subsequently incorporated
into the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and Hong Kong's Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, hence its
continued relevance in this field.
46 Corbett (n 44 above), at 48.
4 Ibid., at 44.
48 Ibid., at 49.
49 Ibid., at 48.
So Ibid., at 47.
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surgically created in a transsexual woman, could "not possibly be described as
ordinary and complete intercourse"" and therefore held that Ms Corbett was
physically incapable of consummating the marriage, with the effect that the
marriage could also be nullified on this ground.
The House of Lords' Affirmation of Corbett in Bellinger
Corbett was very recently affirmed in the United Kingdom by the House of
Lords in Bellinger v Bellinger.52 Ms Bellinger, a post-operative transsexual
woman, sought a declaration from the court regarding the validity of her
marriage to Mr Bellinger some 20 years earlier. The House of Lords, uphold-
ing the Court of Appeal's decision in 2001 , held that as the marriage was
between two biological men, the parties were not respectively male and fe-
male for the purposes of section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
and therefore declared the marriage void.
There were two main strands to the House of Lords' argument. First, the
House of Lords held that it was impossible to stretch the ordinary meaning of
the words "male" and "female" in s 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act to
include post-operative transsexual men and women in their chosen gender.
Importantly, the House of Lords recognised the criticisms which had been
made of Corbett, namely that in determining a person's sex, it was too "reduc-
tionist" to have regard only to three factors, chromosomes, gonads and
genitalia, and that this approach ignored the compelling significance of the
psychological status of the person as a man or woman.' It also observed that
although some overseas jurisdictions had followed Corbett, the current trend
had been in the opposite direction.55 Nevertheless, whilst agreeing that the
words "male" and "female" in section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
were not technical terms and should be given their ordinary, everyday meaning,
their Lordships felt that in contemporary usage in the United Kingdom
(in contrast to the position in Australia, as judicially determined in Attorney
General for the Commonwealth v "Kevin and Jennifer" & Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission),56 the words were incapable of encompassing
post-operative transsexual persons in their chosen gender.' Indeed, any such
I Ibid., at 49.
52 Bellinger v Bellinger 12003] UKHL 21, United Kingdom Parliament, at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldjudgmt/jdO3O4lO/bellin-1.htm (hereinafter "Bellinger (HofL)
") (visited 10 Nov 2004). Also [2003] 2 All ER 593.
53 Bellinger v Bellinger, [2001] EWCA Civ 1140 (Court of Appeal) (hereinafter "Bellinger (CofA)").
Also [2002] 1 All ER 311.
5 Bellinger (HofL) (n 52 above), para 13.
5 Ibid., paras 14 and 35.
56 See below, p 5 28 .
57 Bellinger (HofL) (n 52 above), para 62.
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extension of their meaning "would ... not be an exercise in interpretation
however robust", but rather "a legislative exercise of amendment"."
Second, their Lordships were strongly influenced by the practical conse-
quences that such a "liberal" interpretation of the words "male" and "female"
would entail, observing that the extension of the meaning of these words
would "represent a major change in the law, having far reaching
ramifications".59 These issues were "altogether ill-suited for determination
by courts and court procedures" but rather were "pre-eminently a matter for
parliament",60 particularly when the UK government had already announced
its intention to introduce legislation on the subject. Lord Nicholls of
Birkenhead went so far as to state that it was not "proper" or "responsible"
for the court to determine the law on the basis of the present case,61 since
once it attempted to do so, it would be getting into "deep waters", 62 includ -
ing where the demarcation line should be drawn in granting legal recognition
to transgender persons, for example, whether gender reassignment surgery
should be a prerequisite for recognition, and if so, what particular type of
surgery would be required. 63 The case was not just about marriage, but was
part of a wider problem "which should be considered as a whole" and neces-
sitated "a clear and coherent policy".64
This second part of the House of Lords' judgment is open to criticism.
Indeed, when similar concerns about the far-reaching implications of their
decision were raised by his fellow judges in the Court of Appeal, Thorpe LJ
(dissenting) attempted to reign the issues back to the case in hand, stating
that all that needed to be considered was whether the right of marriage should
be denied to Ms Bellinger, as a post-operative transsexual woman. 65 In Thorpe's
view, "the spectral difficulties are manageable and acceptable if the right is
confined by a construction of section 11(c) to cases of fully achieved post-
operative transsexuals such as the present appellant", as was the approach
taken by the court in the New Zealand case of Attorney-General v Otahuhu
Family Court. Although compelling, Thorpe was unfortunately in the minor-
ity with this view.
Corbett's Waning Influence in Other Common Law Jurisdictions
Ormrod's biological test of sex in Corbett has been extremely influential in
other common law jurisdictions around the world over the last 30 years. Corbett
58 Ibid., para 78.
59 Ibid., para 37.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., para 40.
62 Ibid., para 42.
63 Ibid., para 43.
64 Ibid., para 44.
65 Bellinger (CofA) (n 53 above), para 152.
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has been followed fairly recently in the United States, for example, in the
case of Littleton v Prange.66 Here, the Texas Court of Appeal held that a post-
operative transsexual woman was not entitled to file a medical malpractice
suit regarding the death of her husband as her marriage, being between two
biological men, was invalid and she did not therefore qualify as his surviving
spouse for the purposes of the relevant legislation. Leave to appeal to both
the Texas Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court was rejected."7 Corbett
has also been followed in another Asian common law jurisdiction, Singapore,
in the marriage case of Lim Ying v Hiok Kian Ming Eric.6" However, the
Singapore High Court decision was subsequently reversed by the legislature,
with the effect that marriages of post-operative transsexual persons are now
recognised under Singapore law.69 The court's judgment was also based on a
comprehensive survey of international and comparative case law at the time,
which is now out of date.
Indeed, whilst some jurisdictions are still following Corbett, there is no doubt
that its influence is now waning. In the Australian case of Attorney General for
the Commonwealth v "Kevin and Jennifer" & Human Rights and Equal Opportu-
nity Commission," the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia held that,
in contemporary Australian parlance, the words "man" and "woman" in the
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) would include a post-operative transsexual man and
transsexual woman in their chosen gender," and therefore that the marriage
between a transsexual man and a(nother) biological woman was valid. The
court stated that a significant ground for distinguishing the case from Corbett
was that in Australia, contrary to the position in England, procreative sex was
no longer relevant to marriage; nor was the inability to consummate a mar-
riage still a ground for a decree of nullity in Australia as it was - and continues
to be - in England (and indeed in Hong Kong).72 Corbett was also rejected in
the New Zealand case of Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court (1995)," in
which Justice Ellis similarly observed that the ability to procreate or have sexual
intercourse was not essential to marriage in New Zealand and concluded that
"the law of New Zealand has changed to recognise a shift from sexual activity
66 Littleton v Prange, Texas (1999) 9 SW 3d 223. See further Stephen Whittle, Respect and Equality:
Transsexual and Transgender Rights, (London: Cavendish, 2002), pp 137-139.
67 For further information and documents relating to the case, see Texas Human Rights Foundation,
at http://www.thrf.org/cases.htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
68 Lim Ying v Hiok Kian Ming Eric [1992] 1 Singapore Law Reports 184.
69 See further below, p 545.
70 Kevin and Jennifer (n 8 above).
71 Ibid., paras 60-62.
72 Ibid., para 293. In England, the Matrimonial Causes Act, s 11(c), renders a marriage voidable on
the grounds of non-consummation. The same provision is reproduced in Hong Kong's Matrimonial
Causes Ordinance, s 12 (a).
7 Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court (n 9 above).
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and more emphasis is being placed on psychological and social aspects of sex,
sometimes referred to as gender issues". 4 The Australian and New Zealand
decisions are indicative of a general movement away from Corbett's biological
test of sex; a trend which has reached its high watermark to date in the ECHR
decision of Goodwin.
The ECHR's Rejection of Corbett in Goodwin
In this landmark case in July 2002, and to the ultimate vindication of
transgender activists in the United Kingdom who had repeatedly suffered
defeat before the ECHR on these and other issues, 7  the ECHR held in
Goodwin that, by failing to allow a post-operative transsexual person to marry
in their chosen gender, the United Kingdom was in breach of the right to
marry, as guaranteed by Article 12 of the European Convention (which is
worded in the same way as the right to marry in Article 19 of the BORO).76
After many years of permitting the United Kingdom's policy of refusing
to marry transgender persons in their chosen gender, or to recognise the
validity of such marriages,77 the ECHR finally stated that "the situation as it
has evolved, no longer falls within the United Kingdom's margin of
appreciation".7 1 Whilst the ECHR noted that the right to marry in Article
12 of the European Convention is expressly subject to the national laws of
Contracting States, it reiterated that any limitations thereby introduced "must
not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the
very essence of the right is impaired".79 By limiting the allocation of sex for
the purpose of marriage to that registered at birth, the ECHR held that the
United Kingdom had infringed the very essence of the applicant's right to
marry, putting it in breach of Article 12.8 The UK government's argument
that transsexuals were not barred from marriage since they were able to marry
someone of the opposite biological sex (as is also the case in Hong Kong) was
branded by the ECHR as "artificial".8 '
7 Ibid., at 606.
7 Rees v United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56; 11986] ECHR 9532/81 (hereinafter "Rees"); Cossey v
United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 622; [1990] ECHR 10843/84 (hereinafter "Cossey"); Sheffield and
Horsham v United Kingdom (1997) 27 EHRR 163; [1998] ECHR 22985/93; 5 BHRC 83 (hereinafter
"Sheffield and Horsham"); and X, Y and Z v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 143 (hereinafter "X, Y and Z").
76 Some commentators have however questioned whether Goodwin and I are such welcome decisions,
see Ralph Sandland, "Crossing and Not Crossing: Gender, Sexuality and Melancholy in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom and I v United Kingdom", 11(2)
(2003) Feminist Legal Studies, 191. Sandland argues that, by adopting the traditional binarist ideas
of gender and sexuality and co-opting post-operative transsexual persons into the mainstream, the
ECHR decisions suppress difference and ultimately deny transsexualism.
7 Rees, Cossey and Sheffield and Horsham (n 75 above).
78 Goodwin (n 18 above), paras 103 and 120.
7 Ibid., para 99.
80 Ibid., para 101.
81 Ibid.
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Importantly, the ECHR explicitly rejected Ormrod's biological test of sex
for marriage purposes, as laid down in Corbett. Whilst the ECHR noted that
Article 12 of the European Convention referred in express terms to the right
of a "man" and a "woman" to marry (as does Article 19 of the BORO), it was
not persuaded that, "at the date of this case, it could still be assumed that the
terms must refer to a determination of gender by purely biological criteria"."
Indeed, recognising that major social changes had taken place in the institu-
tion of marriage since the adoption of the European Convention, as well as
dramatic changes brought about by developments in medicine and science in
the field of transsexuality, the ECHR concluded that "a test of congruent
biological factors could no longer be decisive in denying legal recognition to
the change of gender of a post-operative transsexual"." Nor - referring
implicitly to Ormrod's emphasis on the procreative purpose of marriage in his
decision to confine legal sex to biological sex in Corbett - could the inability
of any couple to conceive or parent a child be regarded per se as removing
their right to marry." Other important factors in the ECHR's decision were
that the medical profession and the health authorities in the United King-
dom accepted the condition of gender identity disorder, and that the
government provided treatment for it, including gender reassignment surgery,
out of public funds (as is also the case in Hong Kong)."
Disappointingly, the ECHR left it open to Contracting States to stipulate
other conditions under which marriage would be made accessible to
transgender persons in their jurisdiction.86 To give the ECHR's example, this
could include the particular criteria which a transsexual person would need
to meet in order to prove that their gender reassignment surgery had been
"properly effected"." In addition to being based on an assumption that some
form of gender reassignment surgery is required before a person is entitled to
claim the right to marry, the ECHR's comment also paves the way for further
discrimination as to who qualifies for recognition under the relevant national
legislation." Despite this, the ECHR's ruling in Goodwin remains a landmark
decision in this area.
Goodwin was handed down in the very period between the Court of
Appeal and House of Lords decisions in Bellinger. Although the UK courts
have an obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 to read and give effect
82 Ibid., para 100.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., para 98.
85 Ibid., para 100.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 On the difficulties with setting such a pre-condition to marriage, or full legal recognition, see below,
pp 548-549.
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to domestic legislation in a way which is compatible with European Conven-
tion rights,"9 the House of Lords in Bellinger held that it was impossible to do
so in this case. That is, they felt unable to read the words "male" and "female"
in section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act to include post-operative
transsexual persons in their chosen gender, as required by the ECHR's deci-
sion in Goodwin, and accordingly felt bound to affirm Corbett. Their Lordships
nevertheless made a declaration under the Human Rights Act90 that section
11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act was incompatible with the right to marry
in the European Convention. This "declaration of incompatibility" is of par-
ticular significance in the Hong Kong context, as will be discussed below.91
The Likely Impact of Corbett, Bellinger, Goodwin etc on the Hong Kong Courts'
Interpretation of the Right to Marry
So how are the various authorities discussed above likely to influence the
Hong Kong courts in a judicial review of the authorities' current policies re-
garding the marriages of transgender persons?
On the face of it, as indicated in the author's earlier article, the outlook
might seem bleak. Since it is an English decision made before 1 July 1997, the
Hong Kong courts may feel obligated to follow Corbett in interpreting the
Marriage Ordinance and the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance. 92 As the final
arbiter of Hong Kong law, the Court of Final Appeal would of course have
the power to overrule Corbett as having been wrongly decided or unsuitable
to conditions in Hong Kong, but, presented with a recent House of Lords
decision (Bellinger) affirming Corbett, in a context which closely resembles
Hong Kong's, it would be unlikely to do so on either of these grounds. On this
analysis, the Hong Kong authorities' interpretation of the legislation, and
their consequent deferral to a person's biological sex for the purpose of their
marriage policies, seems fairly watertight, and certainly not arbitrary or irra-
tional in terms of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
89 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3(1).
90 Ibid., s 4(2).
91 See below, p 533.
92 The Basic Law, Arts 8 and 18, provide that the sources of Hong Kong law shall include the com-
mon law. This has been generally accepted as being the English common law, as at 30 Jun 1997
(HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan David [1997] 2 JKC 315, 329). The "common law" arguably includes
judicial decisions relating to the interpretation of English statutory provisions identical to, or sub-
stantially the same as, those in Hong Kong (such as Corbett), as well as English judicial decisions
relating to the development of common law rules. In any event, the Hong Kong courts are likely to
consider such judicial decisions - particularly those emanating from, or affirmed by, the House of
Lords - as highly persuasive.
93 Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the
Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2nd ed, 1999), pp 369-370, n 12.
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However, as stated above, the applicant's argument would be that the fail-
ure of the authorities to recognise a transgender person's right to marry in
their chosen gender is contrary to the right to marry, as guaranteed by the
BORO and the Basic Law. This line of argument provides scope for much
more meaningful judicial review of the authorities' policies than Wednesbury
reasonableness. It also offers far more cause for optimism. Indeed, the Corbett
reading of section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act (which is identical to
section 20(1)(d) of Hong Kong's Matrimonial Causes Ordinance) was ex-
pressly declared by the House of Lords in Bellinger to be contrary to the right
to marry, as guaranteed by the European Convention, even though the House
of Lords ultimately applied Corbett in this case.
There is certainly a strong argument that the right to marry as contained
in BORO and the Basic Law should be interpreted in line with the EHCR
decision in Goodwin. First, the right to marry in the European Convention
(Article 12) is cast in the same terms as the right to marry in the BORO
(Article 19). Both guarantee the right of "men and women of marriageable
age" to marry. The broader formulation of the right to marry in the Basic Law
(Article 37), which simply guarantees the "freedom of marriage to Hong Kong
residents", without any reference to "men" and "women", arguably provides
even more scope for a generous interpretation. Second, the ECHR's reason-
ing in Goodwin is directly transferable to the situation in Hong Kong. Like
the United Kingdom, whose marriage policies were under scrutiny in Goodwin,
Hong Kong's marriage policies are also based on Corbett's biological defini-
tion of sex. As discussed above," the ECHR held that this biological definition
was too restrictive, and that it did not reflect current social, medical and
scientific developments in the field of transsexuality. Further, the ECHR found
it significant that the United Kingdom's medical profession and health au-
thorities recognised gender identity disorder, and that public funding was
provided for gender reassignment surgery, but that legal recognition of a
person's chosen gender was ultimately denied. The very same incongruence
exists in Hong Kong. In addition, it is generally recognised that although
some jurisdictions (such as Texas, the United States) are still following Corbett,
the current international trend is away from Corbett's biological definition of
sex for marriage and other purposes, as demonstrated by the Australian and
New Zealand decisions. Even the House of Lords recognised this fact in
Bellinger.95 Perhaps the Hong Kong courts would therefore find an affinity
with the attitude of the Full Family Court in the Australian case of Kevin
and Jennifer, which stated that even though Australia is not a party to the
European Convention, Goodwin "provides startling confirmation of the
94 See above, p 530.
95 Bellinger (HofL) (n 52 above), paras 14 and 35.
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degree of international isolation that this country would adopt if Corbett is
found to represent the law",96 and therefore held that a post-operative trans-
sexual person should be recognised in their chosen gender for marriage
purposes.
If the Hong Kong authorities' policies were found to be incompatible with
the right to marry in the BORO and the Basic Law, then the courts would
have an obligation to declare their acts invalid. They would also be required
to make a declaration as regards the future reading of the Marriage Ordinance
and Matrimonial Causes Ordinance so as to render the relevant provisions
compatible with the right to marry. If such a reading was not possible, then
the courts would be obliged to declare the legislation invalid or unconstitu-
tional to the extent of the inconsistency. As the Court of Final Appeal has
emphasised in the context of the Basic Law, the exercise of their jurisdiction
in this area is a "matter of obligation, not of discretion"." Importantly, the
Hong Kong courts do not have the "soft option" of making a declaration of
incompatibility between the legislation and the BORO or the Basic Law, as is
available to the UK courts and was exercised by the House of Lords in Bellinger.
One would therefore expect the Hong Kong courts to be more amenable to
interpreting the relevant provisions in the Marriage Ordinance and Matri-
monial Causes Ordinance in line with the right to marry, rather than to striking
them down. They might be aided in this decision by the case of Kevin and
Jennifer, in which (as mentioned above)98 the Australian Full Family Court
upheld Chisholm J's conclusion that the reference to "man" and "woman" in
the relevant marriage legislation did include post-operative transsexual per-
sons in their chosen gender." Particular weight could be given to this
interpretation by the fact that post-operative transsexual persons are already
recognised in their chosen gender for everyday purposes in Hong Kong, through
the physical and social reality of their situation, and through the recognition
granted to their chosen gender on their identity cards, passports and other
documentation.
96 Kevin and Jennifer (n 8 above), para 314.
97 Ng Ka-Ling and other v Director of Immigration (n 22 above), at 337. Although the express provision
to the same effect in the BORO, s 3 was repealed, it is generally accepted that the position remains
the same under general common law principles. See Peter Wesley-Smith, "Maintenance of the Bill
of Rights", 27 HKLJ 15 at 16.
98 See above, p 528.
99 Admittedly, the Australian courts had more grounds on which to come to this conclusion than
would be available to the Hong Kong courts. In particular, the Australian courts had already
recognised post-operative persons in their chosen gender for the purpose of criminal and social
security law, and many states already granted statutory recognition in this area, so a strong case
could be made for maintaining consistency in the context of marriage (see Kevin and Jennifer (n 8
above), paras 289 and 379). However, the Full Family Court also considered medical evidence,
social reality and international legal developments in coming to its decision, and concluded (para
380) that its finding "was consistent with international law and with humanity" and that "a con-
trary finding would, in our opinion, result in considerable injustice to transsexual people and their
children, for no apparent purpose". These considerations are equally applicable to Hong Kong.
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In conclusion, a very strong case can be built regarding the right of post-
operative transsexual persons to be married, or to have their marriages
recognised, in Hong Kong, and therefore for declaring the authorities' cur-
rent policies on marriage as invalid under the BORO and the Basic Law.
However, this still does not address the issue of the right to marry of other
transgender persons; nor does it answer the problem of the lack of legal recog-
nition for post-operative transsexual and other transgender persons in areas
other than marriage. This might be achieved to some extent by challenging
the policy of the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages not to allow an
amendment to the birth certificates of transgender persons to reflect their
chosen gender, drawing on the right to privacy.
Challenging the Current Policy on Birth Certificates and General Non-
recognition of a Transgender Person's Chosen Gender in Law
The Hong Kong authorities' policy of not allowing transgender persons
(including those who have undergone gender reassignment surgery) to change
their birth certificates means that they are forever condemned to their
biological sex, as designated at birth, for all legal purposes. This situation
could be challenged by way of judicial review proceedings under the right to
privacy, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the BORO. This declares, in Article
14(1), that "no-one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy", and, in Article 14(2), provides that "everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interferences". "
The Current Situation in Hong Kong
Registration of births in Hong Kong is governed by the Births and Deaths
Registration Ordinance.01 Although the Births and Deaths Registration
Ordinance does not stipulate the criteria for determining the sex of a child at
birth, the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages has stated that the prac-
tice is to rely on the birth return furnished by the relevant hospital.1 o2 This is
completed by reference to biological criteria - primarily the genitals, but also
gonads and chromosomes in less straight-forward cases. As a historical record,
the only circumstances in which a birth certificate can legally be amended is
if it can be shown there was a clerical error or error of fact or substance when
100 In this case, there is no equivalent right in the Basic Law.
101 Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance (Cap 174), Laws of Hong Kong.
102 Letter to the author from the Director of Immigration (who is also the Registrar of Births, Deaths
and Marriages), 7 Aug 2002 (on file with the author).
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the birth was recorded."' As regards sex, the Registrar has stated that this
would require an error to be proven in the recorded biological sex of the
person,o4 implicitly relying on the Corbett biological test of sex. Such an
error would be extremely rare, although not impossible in the case of inter-
sexed persons, whose biological make-up was incongruent at birth. Therefore,
according to the Registrar, there is no mechanism by which a person's birth
certificate can be amended to reflect their chosen gender in Hong Kong,
even after gender reassignment surgery.'
The privacy implications of the Registrar's position are two-fold. First, the
inability of a transgender person to amend their birth certificate to reflect
their chosen gender means that their biological sex and transgender history
may be revealed against their wishes whenever they are required to produce
their birth certificate. Although the compulsory identity card system in Hong
Kong means that the identity card is relied upon for identification purposes
in most everyday situations, a person must still disclose the sex on their birth
certificate for various official purposes, as well as for insurance purposes. This
situation renders transgender persons vulnerable to prejudice and
discrimination.106 Second, since the birth certificate is the mechanism by
which a person's gender is determined for the purpose of the law, the inability
to change it means that transgender persons will always be legally regarded as
their biological sex. This situation also gives rise to a fundamental discrep-
ancy between their legal status and personal identity, which can be very
distressing for transgender persons.
In England, the Registrar General's refusal to amend the entries of two post-
operative transsexuals in the register of births or to change their birth certificates
- which refusal was based on identical statutory provisions to those in Hong
Kong's Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance - was unsuccessfully chal-
lenged in a (pre-Human Rights Act) judicial review action before the High
Court in R v Registrar General for England and Wales, Ex parte P & G.'
The High Court held that it was neither arbitrary or irrational, in terms of
Wednesbury unreasonableness, for the Registrar General to have acted in this
way. However, the ECHR held in Goodwin that the United Kingdom was in
breach of the right to respect for private life (Article 8 of the European
Convention) for not permitting post-operative transsexual persons to change
their birth certificates in the same situation as currently applies in Hong Kong.
103 Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance, s 27.
104 Letter to the author from the Director of Immigration, 7 Aug 2002 (on file with the author).
105 Ibid.
106 See further Emerton, "Neither Here Nor There" (n 7 above), at 270-271.
10 (Unreported), available at Press for Change, http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/rp-pg.htm (visited
10 Nov 2004).
Vol 34 Part 3 Time for Change 535
HeinOnline -- 34 Hong Kong L.J. 535 2004
As stated above,' the Hong Kong courts may make reference to ECHR deci-
sions - here Goodwin - in interpreting the rights guaranteed in the BORO.1*
The ECHR's Jurisprudence on Privacy: From Rees to Goodwin
The ECHR's decision in Goodwin certainly indicates that there is a prima
facie case to argue under the right to privacy in Article 14 of the BORO.
However, it is important for the analysis below to note that the ECHR's juris-
prudence on transgender privacy issues actually goes back much further than
Goodwin. In the much earlier cases of Rees v United Kingdom,"o and Cossey v
United Kingdom,"' the ECHR held that the UK government was not in breach
of the right to respect for private life by refusing to issue new birth certificates
or alter the register of births of the two transsexual applicants following their
gender reassignment surgery. The ECHR found it significant in these cases
that although a change of birth certificate was not permitted, the United
Kingdom authorities had taken certain other steps to minimise intrusive
enquiries of post-operative transsexual persons (for example, by issuing them
with passports, driving licences and other documents in their new name and
chosen gender, and allowing them legally to change their name). These fac-
tors kept the United Kingdom within the margin of appreciation permitted
to Contracting States, which the ECHR reiterated was particularly wide in
the context of positive obligations, such as those imposed by Article 8 of the
European Convention.112
In the case of B v France,"' however, the ECHR held that a violation of
the right to respect for private life could arise where a post-operative trans-
sexual person had to suffer almost daily disclosure of her private life to third
parties. Like the UK government, the French government did not allow the
applicant to change her birth certificate after gender reassignment surgery.
However, the applicant's situation was greatly compounded by the fact that
she had not been permitted to legally change her first name,"4 nor to change
any of her identity documents, most importantly her national identity card
and passport, but also her voting card, social security number, cheque book,
bank statements and utility invoices. All of these documents still identified
108 See above, p 520.
109 As far as the author is aware, there is no comparative case law which could be drawn upon in this
context.
110 Rees (n 75 above).
Il Cossey (n 75 above).
112 See below, p 540.
113 B vFrance (1993) 16 EHRR 1; [1992] ECHR 13343/87.
114 Interestingly, although the French courts had power to grant a legal change of name, the applicant
was refused on the basis that the name she had proposed was not gender neutral (which would have
been allowed), but rather was exclusively female, ibid., para 57.
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her by her former name and biological sex. The resulting, almost daily, dis-
closure of the applicant's transgender history in this case led the ECHR to
distinguish B v France from Rees and Cossey in finding the French govern-
ment to have breached the applicant's right to respect for private life under
Article 8 of the European Convention.
Until Goodwin, the situation in Hong Kong was in line with ECHR juris-
prudence on this issue. The Hong Kong authorities' policy of issuing new
passports, driving licences and other documentation to post-operative trans-
sexual persons in their chosen gender, in addition to their ability legally to
change their name, kept the situation within Rees and Cossey. Further, the
Hong Kong authorities' policy of issuing new identity cards to post-operative
transsexual persons in their chosen gender meant that they did not fall foul of
B v France. However, Goodwin changed all of that. Overruling its earlier
decisions in Rees and Cossey, the ECHR held that the United Kingdom was
now in breach of its obligation to respect a post-operative transsexual person's
private life, first, by failing to issue her with a birth certificate in her chosen
gender (or otherwise to amend the details recorded in the birth registration
system after gender reassignment surgery), and second, by generally failing to
recognise her chosen gender for the purpose of the law. The United Kingdom
could no longer be allowed to take refuge in the margin of appreciation previ-
ously granted to it.
The ECHR took a fresh approach to the privacy issues in Goodwin, exam-
ining them in a much wider context than the "mere" inability to amend a
birth certificate or birth register. Whilst acknowledging that the level of daily
interference suffered by the post-operative transsexual applicants in Goodwin
was not as high as in B v France, and that some of the difficulties or embar-
rassment faced by them could be avoided or minimised by the practices adopted
by the UK authorities,"' the ECHR focused instead on the serious incongru-
ence between the applicants' post-operative identities and their status in
law,1 16 which it held went against the very grain of Article 8, stating:
"[a] serious interference with private life can arise where the state of do-
mestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal identity. The
stress and alienation arising from a discordance between the position in
society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by
the law which refuses to recognise the change of gender cannot ... be
regarded as a minor inconvenience arising from a formality. A conflict
115 Goodwin (n 18 above), para 89.
116 Although this more fundamental issue had been raised in the earlier cases of Rees and Cossey, the
ECHR's analysis focused each time on the more technical issue of the refusal to alter the register of
births. See Cossey (n 75 above), dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, para 3.2.
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between social reality and law arises which places the transsexual in an
anomalous position, in which he or she may experience feelings of
vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety". 17
As it also noted in the context of the right to marry, the ECHR found it
particularly illogical that the UK government had authorised, and through
its national health service financed, the applicant's gender reassignment
surgery, and yet had refused to recognise the legal implications of such surgery.
Indeed it specifically highlighted the coherence of the administrative and
legal practices within the domestic system as an important factor in its assess-
ment under Article 8.18 Later, emphasising that the very essence of the
European Convention was respect for human dignity and human freedom,
the ECHR stated:
"under Article 8 of the Convention in particular, where the notion of
personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpreta-
tion of its guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of each
individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as hu-
man beings ... the unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative
transsexuals live in an intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the
other is no longer sustainable".119
Finally, as regards the fair balance to be struck between the interests of the
applicants and the interests of the state, the ECHR held that no substantial
hardship or detriment to the public interest had been demonstrated as likely
to result from recognising a post-operative transsexual person's chosen gen-
der in law, and, as regards any other possible consequences, "society might
reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable indi-
viduals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity
chosen by them at great personal cost"."'
The Likely Impact of Goodwin on the Hong Kong Courts' Interpretation of the
Right to Privacy
At first sight, Goodwin would appear to be a strong authority on which to
base a challenge to the present situation in Hong Kong, at least as regards
post-operative transsexual persons. As in the United Kingdom, the Hong
Kong government authorises and funds gender reassignment surgery through
117 Goodwin (n 18 above), para 77.
118 Ibid., para 78.
119 Ibid., para 90.
120 Ibid., para 91.
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its public health service, and grants various administrative concessions to
those who have undergone such surgery, but yet does not follow this through
to its logical conclusion by granting full legal recognition to post-operative
transsexual persons by amending their birth certificates. However, there is
good reason to believe that the Hong Kong courts would not follow Goodwin
in this context.
Article 8(1) of the European Convention states that "everyone has the
right to respect for his private ... life", and Article 8(2) provides that "there
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right",
except in the listed circumstances. In his dissenting opinion in Cossey, Mar-
tens opined that the maintenance in force of a legal system, which "keeps
treating post-operative transsexual persons for legal purposes as members of
the sex which they have disowned psychically and physically as well as so-
cially ... must continuously, directly and distressingly affect their private life"
and as such should be deemed to constitute "a continuing interference with
private life",121 and therefore a violation of the state's negative obligation un-
der Article 8(2). However, the ECHR has consistently approached privacy
issues in its transgender jurisprudence in the context of the state's positive
obligation to "respect" private life under Article 8(1), rather than its nega-
tive obligation not to "interfere with" private life under Article 8(2).
Thus, in the very first case before it, in Rees, the applicant complained
both about the United Kingdom's refusal to issue him with a new birth
certificate and its non-recognition of his chosen gender in law. Despite couch-
ing his whole complaint as an interference with his private life under Article
8(2),122 the ECHR held that only the existence and the scope of the positive
obligations flowing from Article 8(1) were at stake, and that "the mere
refusal to alter the register of births or to issue birth certificates whose con-
tents and nature differ from those of the birth register [could not] be considered
as interferences"."' In B v France, which, as we have seen, involved a very
high degree of daily interference with the applicant's private life, the ECHR
still considered the case in the context of the positive, not the negative,
obligations of the state."' And finally, 10 years later, in Goodwin, the ECHR
commenced its very judgment by stating that the issue turned on "whether or
not the state has failed to comply with a positive obligation to ensure the right
of the applicant, a post-operative male to female transsexual, to respect for
her private life, through the lack of legal recognition given to her gender
reassignment". 125
121 Cossey (n 75 above), para 3.4. Emphasis added.
122 Rees (n 75 above), para 35. See also Whittle (n 66 above), pp 190-191.
123 Rees (n 75 above), para 35.
124 Bv France (n 113 above), para 44.
125 Goodwin (n 18 above), para 71. Emphasis added.
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Perhaps significantly in this context, the right to privacy in Article 14 of
the BORO is formulated differently from Article 8 of the European
Convention. The positive arm of the right to privacy in the BORO (Article
14(2)), unlike Article 8(1) of the European Convention, does not require
the state to "respect" the right to privacy, but rather only to provide "protec-
tion of the law against ... interferences" with privacy. This would appear to be
a more limited positive duty than that contained in Article 8(1) of the Euro-
pean Convention. Certainly, in his commentary on Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which is reproduced
verbatim in Article 14 of the BORO), Nowak states that, whilst Article 17(2)
does place a positive duty on the state to protect the right to privacy, this
duty is limited to protecting against interferences. He further states that the
positive duty does not alter the underlying negative nature of Article 17, which
results from the non-interference formulation of Article 17(1). In particular,
it does not oblige the state to promote or even to facilitate privacy. And, as
with all positive duties to ensure rights, the legislature has relatively broad
discretion in its implementation.126 This certainly seems to offer a ground on
which the Hong Kong courts could reasonably distinguish Goodwin if they
were so minded, and hold that the Hong Kong authorities' policy of refusing
to amend the birth certificates of post-operative transsexual persons was not
in breach of the right to protection against interferences with privacy, as
guaranteed by the BORO.
Finally, the Hong Kong courts are likely, in practice, to be concerned by
the potentially far-reaching ramifications of deciding in accordance with
Goodwin in the privacy context. These implications undoubtedly would be
far greater than those which would arise from applying Goodwin in the mar-
riage context, since they would result in the wholesale legal recognition of
the chosen gender of post-operative transsexual persons. Indeed, the ECHR
was itself mindful in Goodwin of "the difficulties posed or the important
repercussions which any major change in the system will inevitably have, not
only in the field of birth registration, but also in the areas of access to records,
family law, affiliation, inheritance, criminal justice, employment, social
security and insurance". 27 Nevertheless, the ECHR concluded that these
problems were "far from insuperable" and indeed "both manageable and
acceptable if confined to the case of fully achieved and post-operative
transsexuals".128 As domestic (rather than supranational) courts, whose deci-
sion would have immediate effect, it is not difficult to imagine that the Hong
126 Manfred Nowak, "UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary" (Keh am
Rhein: NP Engel, 1993), pp 289-290.
127 Goodwin (n 18 above), para 91.
128 Ibid.
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Kong courts would be more cautious in coming to such a conclusion. Borrow-
ing Silke's VP words in R v Sin Yau Ming, they might therefore determine on
this basis (in addition to the different formulation of the right to privacy in
the European Convention and the BORO), that this is a case in which EHCR
decisions "are helpful, but not always apposite"' 29 and that the issues be best
left to the legislature.
Challenging Marriage and Birth Certificate Policies as Unequal
Treatment
For the sake of completeness, it should briefly be mentioned that a judicial
review application could also be made on the grounds that the authorities'
policies on marriage and birth certificates breach the right to equality, as
enshrined in Articles 1 and 22 of BORO, and Article 25 of the Basic Law.'
Both Articles in the BORO expressly prohibit discrimination on the grounds
inter alia of "sex" or "other status". The Basic Law is silent in this regard, but
it can safely be assumed that its prohibited grounds of discrimination are the
same as those in the BORO.'
There is some international jurisprudence which supports a reading of the
word "sex" in the prohibition of sex discrimination to include discrimination
against transgender persons. In P v S and Cornwall County Council ("P v
S"),132 the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") held that the Equal Treatment
Directive, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the grounds of
sex, 33 applied to discrimination against transsexual persons. Rejecting a
129 R v Sin Yau-ming (n 22 above), at 108. See also Attorney General v Lee Kwong-kut (n 23 above), at 91.
130 Although Art 1 of the BORO can only be invoked in conjunction with another right guaranteed
by the BORO, Art 22 of the BORO and Art 25 of the Basic Law provide free-standing guarantees
of equality.
131 This is because Art 39 of the Basic Law incorporates the ICCPR into domestic law, and the BORO,
as the legislative enactment of the ICCPR, reproduces verbatim the equality provisions of the ICCPR.
See HKSAR v Ng Kung Sui and another (n 34 above), in which the Court of Final Appeal, held on
this basis (at 920-922) that the freedom of expression in Art 27 of the Basic Law was not absolute
and identified the restrictions which may be placed on it by reference to those contained in Art 19
of the ICCPR. The case was applied in HKSAR v Yeung May Wan and others, HCMA 949/2002
(judgment of 10 Nov 2004) in which the Court of Appeal (para 22(4)), read into Art 27 of the
Basic Law the various restrictions on the freedom of expression and assembly contained in Arts 19
and 21 of the ICCPR (reproduced in Arts 16 and 17 of the BORO). The Court of Appeal similarly
read those restrictions into the freedom of assembly in Art 27 of the Basic Law in HKSAR v Leung
Kwok Hung and Others, HCMA 16/2003 (judgment of 10 Nov 2004) paras 16-18.
132 P vS and Cornwall County Council, judgment of the European Court of Justice, 30 Apr 1996, Case
C-13/94 (hereinafter "P v S"), at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/ (visited 10 Nov 2004).
133 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 Feb 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treat-
ment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and
working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p 40), Art 2(1).
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semantic analysis, the ECJ regarded the Directive as "simply the expression
... of the principle of equality". Given that the right not to be discriminated
against on the ground of sex constituted a fundamental human right,"' the
scope of the Directive could not be confined to discrimination based on the
fact that a person was of one or other sex, but must also apply to discrimina-
tion arising from the gender reassignment of a person.'" Such discrimination,
the ECJ held, was "based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the
person concerned",' 36 and to tolerate it "would be tantamount, as regards
such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or
she is entitled". 37
The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of "other status" could
also, arguably, include gender identity. However, there is as yet no interna-
tional nor, to the author's knowledge, comparative jurisprudence in support
of such a reading. In April 2003, the Commission for Human Rights was
asked to adopt a resolution denouncing discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation and gender identity as contrary to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,' 3  which might have provided a useful anchor for such an
argument, but unfortunately (due to its highly controversial nature), consid-
eration of the draft resolution has now been postponed until 2005.
Alternatively, it is widely accepted that discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability is included under the heading "other status" in the equality provision
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 which must
therefore be the reading of the equality provisions in the Basic Law and the
BORO.'40 Although this line of argument obviously has its drawbacks, in
14 P vS (n 132 above), para 19.
135 Ibid., para 20.
136 Ibid., para 21. The Advocate-General's opinion in the case makes particularly informative reading,
see "Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, delivered on 14 Dec 1995, Case C-13/94: P v S and
Cornwall County Council," para 17, at http://www.pcf.org.uk/legal/pvs-ecjr.htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
Whilst the Advocate-General noted (para 17) that "the law dislikes ambiguities and it is certainly
simpler to think in terms of Adam and Eve", he regarded as "obsolete the idea that the law should
take into consideration, and protect, a woman who has suffered discrimination in comparison with
a man, and vice-versa, but den[y] that protection to those who are also discriminated against, again
by reason of sex, merely because they fall outside the traditional man/woman classification". He
stated further (para 20), that "to maintain that the unfavourable treatment suffered by P was not on
account of sex because it was due to her change of sex or else because in such a case it is not possible
to speak of discrimination between the two sexes would be a quibbling formalistic interpretation
and a betrayal of the true essence of that fundamental and inalienable value which is equality".
13 Ibid., para 2 2 .
1 "Human Rights and Sexual Orientation", UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.106-110.
139 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 26. See Office of High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Disability Instruments, at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/instruments.
htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
140 See n 131 above.
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that many transgender persons would prefer not to be regarded as disabled,"'
the Hong Kong courts might be prepared to accept that gender identity disor-
der is a disability for these purposes.'42 Certainly, Hong Kong's Equal
Opportunities Commission has taken this view, and has recently successfully
conciliated a case involving discrimination against a post-operative trans-
sexual woman under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (although its
decisions have no legal standing). 3
The Likely Impact of P v S and Disability Arguments on the Hong Kong Courts'
Interpretation of the Right to Equality
The reasoning in P v S is clearly relevant to the interpretation of the right to
equality and non-discrimination in any context, but in practice, an argument
based on an ECJ, rather than an ECHR, decision might stumble before the
Hong Kong courts. Even Silke VP did not include the jurisprudence of the
ECJ in his wide list of sources which could assist the court in their delibera-
tions under the BORO in his enlightened judgment in R v Sin Yau Ming."'
Whether it is expecting more or less of the Hong Kong courts to ask them to
consider discrimination against transgender persons as discrimination on the
grounds of disability is not clear. Certainly there is no international jurispru-
dence on this point, and the success of such an argument at the domestic
level has been very mixed.'4 ' Further, despite the attractiveness of the equal-
ity approach, it has yet to meet any success in transgender jurisprudence before
the ECHR.M6 It seems unlikely, therefore, that it would find refuge in the
Hong Kong courts, particularly when the issues could be satisfactorily
141 Some of Hong Kong's transgender community are prepared to be classified as having a disability if
this ultimately leads to the recognition of their rights. See, for example, The Church ofJesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints Hong Kong Limited v Jessica Park HCA001167/2001, in which a post-operative
transsexual woman argued that a proposed injunction against her entering the premises of the
relevant Church constituted disability discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance.
As the case was settled out of court, this point was never judicially determined. See further, Emerton,
"Neither Here Nor There" (n 7 above), at 272-273.
142 Particularly as it is a medically-classified psychiatric disorder, see American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM IV, 1994.
143 Ravina Shamdasani, "Victory for woman in Sex Bias Dispute", SCMP, 14 Oct 2004, p 4. See
further Emerton, "Neither Here Nor There" (n 7 above), at 272-273.
144 Rv Sin Yau Ming (n 22 above), at 107.
145 In the United States, for example, a number of state courts have interpreted their disability rights
statutes to exclude transgender plaintiffs, see Paisley Currah and Shannon Minter, "Unprincipled
Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People", 7
Wm & Mary ] of Women & L, 37, 43-44 and accompanying notes.
146 Goodwin (n 18 above), para 108; and X, Y and Z (n 75 above), which concerned the refusal to
recognise the transsexual father of three children conceived to his partner by donor insemination
on their birth certificates. The applicant argued that this violated his right to respect for family life,
and that he was discriminated against in his right to family life, as compared with other non-
biological fathers. See further Whittle (n 66 above), pp 191-193.
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addressed (and perhaps more safely contained)1 7 within the right to marry
and the right to privacy, as they were in Goodwin.
Thus it must still be concluded that an argument based on the right to
marry presents the greatest chance of success in judicial review proceedings
against the current policies of the Hong Kong authorities, and that argu-
ments invoking the right to privacy and equality, whilst potentially offering a
much broader basis for achieving respect for, and recognition of, the chosen
gender of transgender persons, are less likely to succeed before the Hong Kong
courts. Nevertheless, providing a transgender person is willing to front a test
case, the potential for litigation on all of the counts discussed above should
not be underestimated. Given the current interest in transgender issues in
Hong Kong, and the increasing confidence and activism of Hong Kong's
transgender community in calling for their rights, litigation would be an
excellent way to jump-start the debate on legislative reform. Indeed it was
the very attempts to assert the rights of transgender persons through the courts
in Singapore and Japan which, although they failed before the courts, never-
theless raised public awareness of the unjust situation of transgender persons
in their countries, and acted as a catalyst for legislative reform.
Legislating for Change
Clearly, legislation offers the only certain and comprehensive road to reform.
It is likely to be the only way in which to achieve the wholesale legal recog-
nition of the chosen gender of transgender persons - not just for marriage
purposes. In addition, it is probably the only way in which the rights of
transgender persons other than post-operative transsexual persons are likely
to be addressed, as the international and comparative law relied upon to
advance the position of transgender persons in the above analysis is so far
limited to the situation of post-operative transsexual persons.
Legislative Precedent
Importantly, Hong Kong would not be chartering new waters in legislating
for the legal recognition of transgender persons in their chosen gender - there
are numerous models from around the world which it could draw upon in this
147 For once it is established that discrimination against transgender persons constitutes discrimination
on the grounds of sex or other status, all acts of discrimination by the government and public authori-
ties on these grounds are open to scrutiny under Art 22 of the BORO and Art 25 of the Basic Law.
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task. Three models are outlined below as illustrations of the different ap-
proaches which might be adopted. Singapore and Japan are included as they
are the only two countries in Asia which have specifically legislated in this
area, although it is argued that both models are too restrictive for Hong Kong.
The United Kingdom is chosen because of its historical legal connections
with Hong Kong - indeed the similarity between the United Kingdom's and
Hong Kong's legislation and birth registration system in this area make it the
most obvious precedent for Hong Kong to follow. It also offers one of the
most progressive models to date, and one which it is argued Hong Kong could
and should aspire to.
Singapore: Partial Recognition Only
In 1996, overturning the High Court decision in Lim Ying v Hiok Kian Ming
Eric,48 Singapore amended its marriage laws to permit post-operative trans-
sexual persons to be recognised in their chosen gender for marriage
purposes (only).'4 9 Whilst s 12(1) of the Women's Charter states that "a
marriage solemnised in Singapore or elsewhere between persons who, at
the date of the marriage, are not respectively male and female shall be void",
it now expressly stipulates that, for this purpose, "a person who has under-
gone a sex reassignment procedure shall be identified as being of the sex
to which the person has been reassigned"." 0 The position is further cemented
by a provision declaring that a marriage solemnised "between a person who
has undergone a sex reassignment procedure and any person of the opposite
sex is and shall be deemed always to have been a valid marriage"."' It is
not clear what extent of surgery is required in order for a person to be recognised
as having undergone "a sex reassignment procedure" for the purposes of
the law. 5 2 However, far greater uncertainty is caused by the fact that Singapore
has not legislated to recognise the chosen gender of transsexual persons
in any area of the law, other than marriage.' This results in the highly
unsatisfactory position that, for all legal purposes except marriage, a
148 See above, p 528.
149 Women's Charter Amendment Act 1996, s 12. This brought the law back into line with adminis-
trative policy, which, prior to the decision in Lim Ying had been to allow post-operative transsexuals
to marry according to their chosen gender, as well as to change the particulars on their national
identity cards. See further, Debbie S.L. Ong, "The Test of Sex for Marriage in Singapore", (1998)
12 InternationalJournal of Law, Policy and the Family, 161; and K.L. Ter "Transsexual marriages in
Singapore", (1988) Vol 148 New Law Journal 202.
So Singapore Women's Charter (Cap 353), Laws of Singapore, s 12(3)(b).
'5' Ibid., s 12(2).
152 See below, p 549.
153 It was reported in 1997 that proposals were being considered by the Singaporean parliament to
provide full legal recognition of transsexual persons' new status, see Liberty Amicus Brief to the ECHR
in Sheffield and Horsham, at http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/liba-all.htm, para 48.1 (visited 10 Nov 2004).
However, the author has not been able to identify any further reports to this effect.
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transsexual person is still regarded as their biological sex, as recorded on their
birth certificate - as in Hong Kong, it still remains the case in Singapore that
a person's birth certificate cannot be changed unless it can be shown that it
contained an error of fact or substance.I"5 By granting only limited legal rec-
ognition of reassigned sex, arguably this legislation further confuses and
compounds the legal status of transgender persons. It must be rejected as a
model for Hong Kong's reform.
Japan: Eligibility Requirements Too Stringent
In contrast to the situation in Singapore, Japan has recently legislated to
grant full legal recognition to post-operative transsexual persons in their cho-
sen gender. Its "Law concerning special cases in handling gender for people
with Gender Identity Disorder" came into effect on 16 July 2004, which is
quite an achievement since the first legally approved gender reassignment
surgery in Japan was performed only in October 1998 (compared to 1981 in
Hong Kong)."' Indeed, the first case in which a person successfully applied to
the court to change their legal gender under this new law was reported on
29 July 2004."6
As in Singapore, the Japanese legislation was precipitated by the courts'
refusal to recognise the chosen gender of post-operative transsexual persons.
All Japanese citizens are required to be listed in a family register, which con-
tains an official notarised record of birth, marriage, divorce and death, and
also determines a person's legal identity. Like the position in Hong Kong and
Singapore, Japan's Family Registration Law stipulates that a family register
can be corrected only when a "mistake" has occurred in recording the rel-
evant details. Japan's family courts have repeatedly rejected petitions from
post-operative transsexuals to change the registration of their gender in their
family register."' Immediately after the Supreme Court upheld the family
courts' position in an appeal on 2 June 2003,1" a group of Diet members from
154 Registration of Births and Deaths Act (Cap 267), s 24.
155 "Sex Change Marks First Legal Operation", Japan Times, 15 Oct 1998, p 3 ; "Nation's 1st Sex Change
Carried Out", The Daily Yomiuri, 17 Oct 1998, reproduced at Trans News: Japan at http://transnews
at.infoseek.co.jp/english - index.htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
156 "Transsexual's 'Change' Recognized", CBSNEWS.com, Tokyo, 29 Jul 2004, at http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2004/07/29/world/main632792.shtml (visited 10 Nov 2004).
157 In May 2001, six Japanese transsexuals who had undergone gender reassignment surgery separately
filed petitions at four different family courts to have their chosen gender legally recognised on their
family register. None of the petitions were accepted, see "Court Rejects Transsexual's Demand to
Alter Gender in Register", Kyodo News, 13 Jan 2003 (reproduced at http://transnews.at.infoseek.
co.jp/english index.htm) and "Transsexual's SOS Answered", Japan Times, 6 June 2003 (reproduced
at http://www.tg.connect.com/) (visited 10 Nov 2004).
158 The Supreme Court did not hand down a judgment in this case, nor, to the author's knowledge, has
the case been given an official name or citation. The case was, however, widely referred to in the
press. See, for example, "Transsexual's SOS Answered", Japan Times, 6 June 2003 (reproduced at
http://www.tg.connect.com/); and "Bill Would Let People Change Registered Gender", asahi.com,
12 June 2003 (reproduced at http://www.ftmaustrali.org/media/03/0612.html) (visited 10 Nov 2004).
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the ruling coalition party started to prepare a bill to grant legal recognition of
the chosen gender of post-operative transsexuals. This would be by way of
amendment to the family register, under the auspices of the family courts.
Extraordinarily, the bill was approved by both houses only one month later,
on 10 July 2003.159
Although Japan's legislation is a first for Asia in granting full legal recog-
nition to the chosen gender of post-operative transsexual persons, it is not
recommended as a model for Hong Kong. This is due to the extremely restric-
tive criteria which it places on persons eligible to benefit from the legislation.
Apart from the requirements that the applicant must have been medically
diagnosed with gender dysphoria and be over 20 years of age, he or she must
also be (a) single; (b) childless; (c) medically incapable of reproducing as a
result of surgical procedures or other medical treatment; and (d) have the
genital organs appropriate to persons of the biological sex that they associate
with.160 This raises a number of issues which would need to be considered
in drafting similar legislation for Hong Kong, and which would need to be
thoroughly debated in the Legislative Council.
The first requirement that a person must be single before they can be
legally recognised in their chosen gender is very common and is even con-
tained in the United Kingdom's Gender Recognition Act, which is otherwise
very inclusive. This does not mean, however, that such a requirement, which
discriminates against those few couples whose marriages have survived one
spouse's transition, should be proposed or endorsed in Hong Kong. This par-
ticular issue will be discussed in detail below, in the context of the United
Kingdom's Act.16'
Second, the requirement that an applicant must not have any children can
only be described as draconian. It is not at all unusual for transsexual persons to
have attempted to live out the gender role ascribed to them by their biological
sex and have married and/or had children before undergoing sex reassignment.
All these persons will be barred from legal recognition under Japan's law.
Unfortunately, the available literature does not elaborate on the reasoning
behind this requirement, 162 other than to make broad reference to the need to
159 "Law Revision Allows Japanese to Officially Change Sex", Mainichi Daily News, 10 Jul 2003,
at http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200307/10/index.html, and also reproduced at FTMA,
http://www.ftmaustralia.org/media/03/0710.html (visited 10 Nov 2004).
160 Unofficial translation of the main body of the Japanese law, kindly provided by Koichi Taniguchi,
JSPS Research Fellow, Graduate School of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo (hereinafter
"Unofficial Translation of Japan's Transgender Law"). See also, Yuka Ogaki, "New Japanese Law
Concerning Special Cases in Handling Gender for People with Gender Identity Disorder (GID)",
14 Aug 2003 (reproduced at http://transnews.at.infoseek.co.jp/japanlaw.htm) (although Ogaki does
not make reference to the requirement for appropriate genital organs) (visited 10 Nov 2004).
161 See below, pp 552-554.
162 The author has not been able to locate any academic articles written in English on this subject, and
was still awaiting two articles in Japanese by Shuhei Ninomiya at the time of publication.
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protect the best interests of the children of transsexual persons, without sub-
stantiating the concerns.'63 Members of Japan's Diet must certainly have felt
strongly about the point, for it is reported that two transgender groups who
intended to hold a press conference to criticise the bill, and the childlessness
requirement in particular, were pressured not to take it further on the basis that
the legislative team would otherwise stop working on the bill.'64 Notably, no
other country's legislation makes childlessness a pre-condition for a legal change
of gender.'65
Japan's law requires, thirdly, that a person must be sterile. This is also a
pre-condition to legal recognition in some other countries, such as Germany,
Sweden and the Netherlands.166 Japan's requirement that a person be unable
to reproduce, whether through "surgery or other medical treatment" (emphasis
added) initially appears to encompass persons who have only undergone hor-
mone therapy (which would for all practical purposes render them infertile
after a certain period), but who have not undergone constructive genital sur-
gery (which would render them permanently incapable of procreation).
However, the fourth criteria, namely that the person has "the genital organs
appropriate to persons of the biological sex that they associate with", makes it
clear that genital surgery is in fact a pre-condition to legal recognition, and
that hormonal treatment alone will not suffice.
Admittedly, the requirement to undergo some level of surgery is common,
indeed it could be said to be the norm, in legislation of this kind. It is found
for example, in the legislation of most European countries (except most nota-
bly the United Kingdom),167 Australian states and territories,' 8 Canadian
provinces,169 and in New Zealand.' The effect of this requirement, however,
is to discriminate against persons who for health reasons cannot undergo major
surgical intervention, and against persons who for other reasons do not wish
to do so. The pertinent question, as Stephen Whittle succinctly puts it, is
whether individuals should "be obliged to undergo specific surgical proce-
dures and their associated health risks before they will be recognised by the
law as the social man or woman that they are?""'
163 For example, "Bill Would Let People Change Registered Gender" (n 158 above), which states
rather crudely that "it would be very tough for a child with a father one day who the next day is
suddenly a woman to deal with the reality".
164 Ogaki (n 160 above), p 2.
165 Stephen Whittle, Why Support the Gender Recognition Bill?, Press for Change, 4 Nov 2003,
http://www.pfc.org.uk/gr-bill/whysup.htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
166 Home Office, Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, Apr 2000, p 21,
at http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/legs.htm (hereinafter "Working Group Report")
(visited 10 Nov 2004), Annex 4, pp 58-67.
167 Ibid.
168 For example, Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and New South Wales, ibid., pp 58-59.
169 For example, Alberta, Quebec and Ontario, ibid., pp 59-60.
170 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995, s 28, ibid., pp 60-61.
17 Whittle (n 66 above), pp 162-163.
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Moreover, particular concerns arise in the context of female-to-male
transsexual persons due to the particular formulation adopted in Japan's law,
which (like similar laws in Germany, Finland, Denmark and Holland for
example),172 specifically requires surgery resulting in "the genital organs
appropriate to persons of the biological sex that they associate with".
Although not specifying which operations must be completed, this wording
could be interpreted to require transsexual men to undergo a phalloplasty,
that is, the surgical creation of the penis. Whilst surgical techniques are
constantly improving, such surgery is still described as "very expensive" and
it "can involve multiple surgical procedures, and is very variable in its results
with little guarantee of success". 7 1 As a result, many transsexual men decide
not to undergo the numerous operations that phalloplasty entails, but rather
limit their surgery to a bilateral mastectomy (surgical removal of the breasts),
oophorectomy (removal of the ovaries), hysterectomy (removal of the womb)
and vaginal occlusion (closing of the vaginal entrance)."' If Japan's law is
interpreted as making phalloplastic surgery a pre-condition for legal
recognition, it will put considerable pressure on transsexual men to go through
with the surgery, when they might otherwise have chosen not to. This situa-
tion would be totally unacceptable and unnecessary, since many jurisdictions
have successfully afforded legal recognition to transsexual men without
requiring such genital surgery.'7 ' By leaving the point open to interpretation,
the bill is likely to result in uncertainty amongst Japan's transgender
community, and potentially lead to discrimination against female-to-male
transsexual persons. Such uncertainty and discrimination should be avoided
in Hong Kong's legislation.
Reports suggest that that the bill's proposers in Japan opted for the path of
least resistance. They decided to propose a very conservative law which they
knew they could get through parliament quickly (ultimately in less than a
month). Whilst not ideal, it was felt that it would improve the lives of many,
and could be strengthened at a later date. Indeed the law itself provides for a
review three years after its formal introduction, and revisions if necessary.176
172 Whittle (n 165 above), and Working Group Report (n 166 above), Annex 4.
173 Whittle (n 66 above), pp 162-163 and further pp 247-248.
17 Ibid., p 248.
u7 Working Group Report, Annex 2, p 36. Courts in Germany have held that a similarly-worded
requirement does not require phalloplasty and vaginal occlusion, case of OLG Zweibrucken (1992),
see Liberty Amicus Brief to the ECHR in Sheffield and Horsham (n 153 above), para 12.13. The same
conclusion was reached by the State Appeal Court in Ontario, Canada in 1997, see Whittle (n 66
above), pp 247-248. Similar issues arise through the possible requirement of a vaginectomy, that is
the removal of the vagina, which again most transsexual men, even those who have had full
phalloplastic surgery, choose not to undergo, since it involves major surgery and can result in the
loss of sexual sensation. Moreover, for those who choose not to undergo phalloplastic surgery, the
retention of the vaginal tissues is imperative if surgical procedures improve and phalloplasty be-
comes a more likely option, see Whittle (n 66 above), p 247.
176 Unofficial Translation of Japan's Transgender Law (n 160 above) and "Bill Would Let People Change
Registered Gender" (n 158 above).
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Taking such a shortcut, however, should be strongly resisted in Hong Kong. It
is far better for the legislative process to take longer, if it means that the
resulting legislation is properly informed and well thought-out, and as a result
hopefully more inclusive than the Japanese model. Time pressures on the
Legislative Council also render a two-stage process impractical and inefficient.
The United Kingdom: Best Practice Model
It is the United Kingdom's Gender Recognition Act,"' which received Royal
Assent on 1 July 2004, which provides the most attractive model for Hong
Kong to adopt, since its provisions would take effect in substantially the same
administrative and legal framework as Hong Kong. In addition, the Gender
Recognition Act offers one of the most progressive models in the world in
terms of its inclusiveness and comprehensiveness, addressing most of the limi-
tations of Singapore's and Japan's models, as discussed above. This undoubtedly
owes a great deal to the commitment of the United Kingdom's transgender
community in informing and educating the legislative process. It is a fitting
model for the times, and one which Hong Kong should be proud to follow.
In April 1999, the UK government set up an Interdepartmental Working
Group on Transsexual People tasked with considering "with particular refer-
ence to birth certificates, the need for appropriate legal measures to address
the problems experienced by transsexual people, having due regard to scien-
tific and societal developments, and measures undertaken in other countries
to deal with this issue".' The establishment of the Working Group was in
direct response to the ECHR's criticisms of the UK government for failing to
take any steps to keep this area of the law under review, despite repeated
requests by the ECHR for it to do so.17 9 Although the Working Group pre-
sented its report to parliament in July 2000,180 the report still remained under
"active consideration within government" (ie nothing at all had come of it)
in August 2002."8
In finally ruling against the United Kingdom in Goodwin in July 2002, the
ECHR took the view that the "sands of time" had run out. 18 2 The Working
Group was reconvened to urgently consider the implications of the ECHR
177 The Bill applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland and, by virtue of a "Sewel Motion", which
was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 5 Feb 2004, also to Scotland. For the text of the Gender
Recognition Act and documentation relating to its legislative passage, see UK Department of Con-
stitutional Affairs at http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/legs.htm; and for other useful
background information, http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/ (visited 10 Nov 2004).178 Terms of reference cited in Working Group Report (n 166 above), p (i).
179 Sheffield and Horsham (n 75 above), para 60, referring to its previous requests to this effect in Rees
and Cossey.
180 Ibid.
181 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transsexual People: Update, August 2002, at http://
www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/tpeople.htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
182 Bellinger (HofL) (n 52 above), para 21.
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judgment.' Bringing fruition to many years of judicial and political activism
by the United Kingdom's transgender community, the UK government
finally published its draft Gender Recognition Bill on 11 July 2003, exactly
one year after the Goodwin decision.' Having passed its final reading before
the House of Lords on 8 June 2004, the Bill received Royal Assent on 1 July
2004. However, it will not come into full force until all the necessary regula-
tions have been passed, and all the administrative and procedural details put
in place to fully implement the law. This is expected to have been achieved
by early 2005."'
The Gender Recognition Act provides for the full legal recognition of
transgender persons in their chosen gender (or "acquired gender", as this is
referred to in the Act). In this way, it is far more satisfactory than the
Singaporean legislation which only grants legal recognition for the purpose
of marriage. Under the Act, transgender persons living in their acquired gender,
or having changed gender under the law of a country or territory outside the
United Kingdom,' will be able to apply to a Gender Recognition Panel for
a Gender Recognition Certificate,' which will afford them all the legal rights
and responsibilities appropriate to their acquired gender.' 8 The Gender Rec-
ognition Certificate will also entitle them to a new birth certificate if their
birth was recorded in the United Kingdom, which will reflect their new name
and acquired gender."' Neither copies of the birth register entry nor the new
birth certificate will contain any indication of their transgender history,190
and whilst the original birth certificate will be retained as a historical record,
stringent provisions are included in the Act to protect the privacy of all
applicants.' 9 '
The Act is very comprehensive, ensuring absolute certainty across all
relevant fields of law - provisions are made, for example, regarding the
183 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transsexual People: Update, August 2002, ibid., as also
referred to in Bellinger (HofL), ibid., para 25.
184 Note that this was not the first bill to be introduced on the subject; an earlier private member's bill,
the "Alex Carlisle Bill", introduced in 1996, was unsuccessful, Working Group Report (n 166 above),
p 34.
185 Department for Constitutional Affairs, "Transsexual People: Legislation", at http://www.dca.gov.
uk/consitution/transsex/legs.htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
186 Gender Recognition Act, s 1.
187 The Gender Recognition Panel, which is comprised of legal and medical experts (see Sch 1), offers
an alternative to the model adopted in many other countries, including Japan, under which appli-
cations are vetted by the court.
188 On issue of the Gender Recognition Certificate, "the person's gender becomes for all purposes the
acquired gender", Gender Recognition Act, s 9.
189 Ibid., s 10.
190 Ibid., Sch 3, ss 3(3) and 6.
191 Ibid., see in particular Sch 3. Section 22(1) also makes it an offence for a person who has acquired
information regarding a person's application in an official capacity to disclose it to others except in
limited circumstances.
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availability of social security benefits and pensions, succession, participa-
tion in competitive sports, and the interpretation of gender-specific offences
where the accused is involved in sexual activity. Minor consequential amend-
ments are also made to various statutes, including the Marriage Act 1949,
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1976.
The most progressive element of the Act, however, is its inclusiveness in
terms of who is eligible to apply for legal recognition. The Act applies to all
persons over 18 years of age who are living in their acquired gender, whether
or not they have had gender reassignment surgery. The Act therefore requires
Gender Recognition Certificates to be granted to applicants who have, or
have had, gender dysphoria (as confirmed by medical evidence) and who
have lived in their acquired gender throughout the two-year period before
their application is made and intend to continue to do so until death (as
evidenced by statutory declaration).'9 2 No surgical or medical pre-conditions
are imposed, although in practice, proof of medical treatment and/or surgery
may aid the application process. There is also no requirement for a person to
be sterile or childless (as in Japan, for example);' 93 in fact the Act specifically
states that transgender persons shall retain all parental rights and
responsibilities. 194
One aspect of the Act which has caused particular disappointment amongst
the transgender community, however, is the requirement that transgender
persons who are married must dissolve their marriage if they wish to obtain a
full Gender Recognition Certificate,19 that is they must be single before be-
ing legally recognised in their acquired gender. This is not uncommon -
married persons are also barred from registration in their chosen gender in,
for example, New Zealand, New South Wales, Australia, Quebec, Canada,
Japan, and many countries in Europe (including Austria, Belgium, Finland
and Germany)."'
The issue that has dogged the debate is that if a pre-existing marriage were
allowed to continue after one of the parties had received legal recognition in
their chosen gender, it would in effect become a gay or lesbian marriage.
Such marriages are currently not permissible under UK law (nor under Hong
Kong law). No real purpose seems to be served by insisting that a couple
should divorce in order for the chosen gender of the transgender spouse to be
192 Ibid., ss 2 and 3.
193 See above, pp 547-548.
194 Gender Recognition Act, s 12.
195 Applicants who are married are therefore issued with an interim Gender Recognition Certificate
(s 4(3)). They only receive a full Gender Recognition Certificate if their marriage is annulled by
the court or the marriage is otherwise dissolved, annulled or terminated on the death of one's
spouse, within six months of the issue of the interim certificate (ss 5(1) and 5(2) respectively).
196 Working Group Report (n 166 above), Annex 4, pp 58-67.
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recognised. The rights and interests of the non-transgender spouse should
also not be ignored, who will lose security, as well as financial and tax ben-
efits upon divorce.197 However, the UK government felt that if the pre-existing
marriages of transgender persons were permitted to remain in place despite
one party's legal change of gender, then this would be granting them "special
allowances which do not apply to other groups in society".198 As some com-
mentators have argued, it would be entirely possible for such marriages - which
in numerical terms are likely to be extremely small - to be recognised as an
accepted anomaly, without creating a precedent for marriage between gay or
lesbian persons.19
This issue troubled the Joint Committee of Human Rights when it
reviewed the draft Bill, and it recommended in its report that the govern-
ment reconsider the requirement for subsisting marriages to be dissolved as
a pre-condition to legal recognition.zoo A motion was also made to the
House of Commons on 25 May 2004 to amend the Bill so as to allow for the
issue of a full Gender Recognition Certificate despite the continuation of a
pre-existing marriage if neither party wished the marriage to be dissolved and
both parties could show that they intended to continue to live together.
However, the motion was defeated by 303 to 94 votes.20'
The Act therefore greatly disadvantages the small number of transgender
persons who married in accordance with their biological sex and whose mar-
riages have survived, despite their transition. They will now have to decide
whether to remain married or to dissolve their marriage so as to obtain legal
recognition in their chosen gender. However, the Civil Partnership Act, which
became law on 18 November 2004 (and under which the first partnership
registrations are expected to take place by the end of 2005),202 will give such
197 Press for Change, Submission to the Working Group, cited in Working Group Report (n 166 above),
p 22. Interestingly, the Joint Committee on Human Rights proposed that the legislation should
relieve parties to the marriage of any adverse financial and tax consequences of the ending of the
marriage by reason of the provisions of the legislation, as long as the parties enter into a civil
partnership within a reasonable time if and when the civil partnership legislation is in force, House
of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights: Fourth Report (20 Nov 2003), http:/
/www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtrights/34/3402.htm (hereinafter "Joint
Committee Report"), para 91 (visited 10 Nov 2004).
198 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Gender Recognition Bill, Frequently Asked Questions, Revised
January 2004, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/faqs.htm (visited 10 Nov
2004).
199 Working Group Report (n 166 above), p 51.
200 Joint Committee Report (n 197 above), para 89.
201 Hansard House of Commons Daily Debates for 25 May 2004 (Pt 30), Column 1521, at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd.htm (visited 10 Nov 2004).
202 "Stonewall hails 'historic step forward' as House of Lords backs Civil Partnership", Stonewall, 17
Nov 2004, at http://www.stonewall.org.uk/stonewall/news/victory-civil-pa.html (visited 1 Dec
2004). For the text of the Civil Partnership Bill and related documents, see the United Kingdom
Parliament, at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/1d200304/ldbills/053/2004053.
htm (visited 1 Dec 2004).
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transgender persons in the United Kingdom the option of being able to dis-
solve their marriage and then enter to into a civil partnership. Whilst it is no
doubt time-consuming, costly and distressing to oblige such transgender per-
sons to go through this procedure in order to safeguard their legal and financial
position, the Civil Partnership Act is generally to be welcomed as providing
gay and lesbian couples with the opportunity to secure almost the same rights
and responsibilities as are available through marriage. However as there is
likely to be only a handful of couples in Hong Kong in this situation, and the
possibility of "same-sex" marriage or civil partnership being permitted in Hong
Kong is still rather remote,"' the Hong Kong government should be urged
not to follow the United Kingdom's Gender Recognition Act in this respect.
An additional requirement in Hong Kong (it is already provided in the
United Kingdom)zo4 is some form of protection against discrimination and
harassment on the grounds of a person's transition (including gender reas-
signment surgery) or transgender history. Whilst detailed discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of this article, ideally, this would take the form of
an amendment to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, so as to encompass
discrimination due to a person's transition or transgender status within the
meaning of discrimination on the grounds of sex.205 Alternatively (as, per-
haps surprisingly, many in the transgender community in Hong Kong seem
to prefer)206 protection might be achieved through specific anti-discrimina-
tion legislation. Legislation is currently under consideration by the Hong
Kong government in relation to discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation.207 This could be extended to include discrimination on the
grounds of gender identity, if lobbying by transgender activists within the
Home Affairs Bureau's recently established Sexual Minorities Forum is
successful. This would complete the legislative package.
203 The Hong Kong government has announced that it intends to launch a survey on public attitudes
towards the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation on the grounds of sexual orientation
and on possible recognition of same-sex civil partnerships by the end of 2 0 0 4/early 2005, but has
stated that it will not proceed on these issues unless at least 50% of the public is support; see Tim
Cribb, "Quest for Equality", SCMP, 27 Jul 2004, p 14.
204 Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999. Note that the United Kingdom
provisions provide no protection as regards discrimination in the field of goods and services; see
Whittle (n 66 above), p 120. However, these fields are covered by the Sex Discrimination Ordinance,
as well as the Disability Discrimination Ordinance and Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, and
can therefore reasonably be expected to be covered by a revised Sex Discrimination Ordinance or
to be included in any new anti-discrimination legislation.
205 For an excellent discussion of transgenderism's engagement with sex discrimination law, focusing
on the operation and effect of anti-discrimination laws in relation to transgender claimants in the
courts in the United States, Europe and Canada, see Laura Grenfell, "Embracing Law's Categories:
Anti-Discrimination Laws and Transgenderism", 15 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 51.206 Based on the author's discussions with members of the transgender community in Hong Kong.207 Tim Cribb, "Survey to Test the Water for Gay Law", SCMP, 27 Jul 2004, p 3.
(2004) HKLJ554 Robyn Emerton
HeinOnline -- 34 Hong Kong L.J. 554 2004
Time for Change 555
Conclusion
The time has come for Hong Kong's transgender persons to be granted their
due respect and dignity in society. This can only be realised through the full
recognition of their chosen gender in law, as has already been achieved in
many other parts of the world. In the Asia-Pacific region alone, Hong Kong is
lagging behind Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and even
China in not granting any legal recognition at all to its transgender population,
despite funding gender reassignment surgery and recognising the chosen gen-
der of those who have undergone such surgery for administrative purposes.
Invoking human rights guarantees in the BORO and the Basic Law to chal-
lenge the current policies of the Hong Kong authorities offers one route to
reform. Although success might be limited to the area of marriage and to the
situation of post-operative transsexual persons, this in itself would be a sig-
nificant achievement. Litigation could also play an important role in educating
the public of the inhumane situation in which Hong Kong's transgender per-
sons find themselves, and help to push forward the debate on their rights.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong's legislators should be lobbied to take up the matter,
and should be urged to work towards the prompt introduction of legislation
in this area. This route would hopefully lead to more comprehensive cover-
age of the issues than can realistically be achieved in the courts, and to more
inclusiveness in terms of the range of transgender persons who would benefit
from the legislation. The task is greatly aided by the availability of legislative
models from around the world and in particular the UK Gender Recognition
Act, which will take effect in the same legislative and administrative frame-
work as Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong's transgender population is only a
very small minority, this makes legislative protection even more important.
The time is surely ripe for change.
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